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This chapter revisits the issue of elections and democracy in 
Africa, a theme that emerged as dominant in scholarly dis-
cussions in African Studies in the 1990s. The trigger for fea-
turing Ethiopia as a case study was the May 2010 parliamen-
tary elections when the incumbent party, which had been in 
power since 1991, took 99.6% of all the seats. While the various 
Ethiopian elections will not be discussed in detail, the political 
culture or wider context in which they occur – and always pro-
duce the same overall result – will be highlighted to demon-
strate the enduring mechanisms and problems of hegemonic 
rule and how difficult it is to create a democratic system that 
allows for changes in power (i.e. alternation). The relationship 
between one-party rule and economic development will also be 
discussed – the latter being a donor obsession that clouds the 
political agenda. The chapter closes with some reflections on 
the recurring donor-country dilemmas when it comes to dealing 
with electoral autocracies, such as Ethiopia. 
 
‘One can neither plough the sky, nor take the King to court’ 
(an Ethiopian peasant proverb) 
Introduction 
While somewhat unfashionable nowadays, the issue of elections and democrati-
zation is still being discussed in comparative political studies (cf. Diamond & 
Plattner 2010; Lindbergh 2009a, 2009b; van de Walle 2009; Rakner & van de 
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Walle 2009). It also still appears in development policy towards Africa, es-
pecially when related to issues of governance that currently feature prominently 
in international donor discourse. The emergence of democratic structures is 
generally seen as the desired end to international development policies. Some 
authors have argued that overall economic development is enhanced by democ-
ratic rule in a country, including multiparty elections, a free media, responsive 
state institutions and a vibrant civil society (cf. van de Walle 2009), but I con-
tend that there is not necessarily a relationship between the domains of eco-
nomics and politics.1 Many autocratic systems in- and outside Africa permit and 
enhance economic development that is often accompanied by human-rights 
abuse, rent seeking, patronage and corruption.2 China is the most obvious exam-
ple with its huge economic success, continued repressive and state-led politics, 
its illegal occupation of minority regions (e.g. Tibet) and huge social inequality. 
Ethiopia, Angola and Equatorial Guinea can be considered as examples of 
developmental autocracies in Africa and it is only when the social and political 
costs of these practices become too great that moves towards public account-
ability and democratic decision-making develop, but not in any predictable 
sequence. This uncomfortable truth has led to policy mistakes as well as 
contradictions in the approach of donor countries and international institutions 
towards developing countries, notably in Africa. A donor country or UN-spon-
sored focus on multiparty elections as a panacea or means of installing democ-
racy in a developing or post-conflict society can be helpful but only if elections 
are seen as one element in a wider context of societal democratization. Seeing 
the existence of some form of elections as being sufficient per se to encourage 
democracy is a fallacy. 
The general contention in this chapter is that elections in divided African 
societies marred by underdevelopment, poverty and elite autocracy are preca-
rious and do not, by definition, enhance a democratic culture or institutional 
stability, especially not if a professional, independent judicial structure is not in 
place. For the elites in place it is not democratic political inclusiveness and 
equity that are the priority but rather their hegemonic and ostentatious display 
and exercise of power – these are the mark of success (cf. van Beek, this 
volume). Democratic systems in Africa exist but, apart from the longer-estab-
lished positive exceptions like Botswana, Senegal, Ghana and Mauritius, the 
other examples are far from stable. Ethiopia may have started out well in 1991 
after the demise of its military regime but it has not lived up to its initial 
                                                            
1  I wish to thank Anneloes Viveen at the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs for 
her input in a draft conference paper that formed the basis of this chapter. 
2  As Robert Kagan noted (2008: 57): “Growing national wealth and autocracy have 
proven compatible after all. Autocrats learn and adjust”. 
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promises (cf. Aalen & Tronvoll 2008; Tronvoll 2011; Vestal 1996, 2008). To 
understand the reasons behind this, we need to recall the wider political context 
and political culture of power and governance in this complex society. 
It may be wishful thinking but if the aim is to achieve a durable process of 
political democratization one might say that it would be better to support the 
creation and professionalization of a strong and credible justice system, 
preferably based on international rule-of-law principles as well as indigenous 
notions and procedures of just law and the rights of persons. An electoral 
process alone is not enough. In this view I follow Gerti Hesseling (2006: 36-37) 
who pleaded for an inventive reinforcing of the constitutional state, while 
recognizing the African specifics of history and culture that make up the ‘living 
law’ and preclude a direct ‘transplant’ of Western or other foreign rule-of-law 
ideas on African settings. But a constitutional state with core principles is 
shared fairly universally (Ibid: 31) and is recognizable too in African traditions 
of just rule and limits on the sovereign’s exercise of power (cf. van Binsbergen, 
this volume).  
A judicial system within a constitutional state should ideally protect citizens 
from the arbitrary use of power by the state or sovereign; maintain autonomy 
and distance from the Executive (the ruling government); enshrine liberal 
freedoms similar to those laid out in the UN Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights (1948) and the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (1981). It 
should also allow the right of appeal to all by law; offer protection of property 
and investment; and make the Executive accountable to the judiciary. But it can 
also take inspiration from the local traditions of justice and rights that are 
formulated by collective and individual actors. A more serious consideration of 
the societal contexts of politics and law in Africa is therefore important, as Gerti 
Hesseling (2006: 39) noted.3 
Whether the development of such structures of constitutionalism, the rule of 
law, and independent justice is still a realistic proposition for most African 
countries – or many other developing countries – is a moot point. Practice rarely 
matches rhetoric and the often-touted panacea of the ‘rule of law state’ for 
conflict-ridden and undemocratic abusive regimes sounds over-optimistic 
(Carothers 2006: 3). Conditions are not good (cf. Erdmann 2011). Despite a 
new economic dynamics, many African states are mechanisms for reconstructed 
autocratic elite rule and are ‘fragile’ or contain significant ‘un- or under-
governed’ spaces where new and violent formations of power are emerging and 
                                                            
3  The same argument, but even less heeded, goes for development policies (cf. Ber-
gendorff 2007: 195), that usually ignore cultural complexities, seeing them as irre-
levant or cumbersome. The long-term result is (costly) resistance, sabotage or armed 
revolt by citizens. 
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holding sway. Here we could mention, for example, the bases of piracy in 
Somalia, bandit-ruled areas in central Africa and the rebel militia-run spaces in 
Nigeria and Chad.4 These will not soon turn into ‘orderly states’ as we like to 
see them in the West. One might also note that the popularity and feasibility of 
classic Western liberal democracies themselves, with their diffuse multiparty 
structures, sovereign parliaments, slow decision-making and the crucial role of 
elections, are strongly contested, both within and in the world at large, due to 
forces of globalization, transnationalism, populism, and the ethnic and regional 
fragmentation of domestic constituencies.5 Debates about new approaches to 
democracy and the constitutional state are thus also evident in the rest of the 
world (cf. O’Flynn 2006; Forst 2006). In addition, in the face of the more 
overriding global economic ideals, of growth, increased GDP, energy security, 
market expansion and poverty reduction that are touted daily by global insti-
tutions, issues of democratic governance and respect for political and human 
rights often appear secondary.  
Ideally, an independent and professional judiciary, based on universal prin-
ciples regarding equality before the law, legal rights and due process, and 
recognizable as such in most societies (cf. Hesseling 2006: 31), would contri-
bute favourably to a democratic culture. It would enhance a safer judicial 
environment, thus furthering the protection of property, stimulating equitable 
socio-economic development and business growth, reducing patronage and cor-
ruption, and protecting civic freedoms (the human and social rights of citizens), 
as well as encouraging free and fair elections with the possibility for changes in 
power. An indirect result might also be greater social stability and the emer-
gence of a middle class instead of a crony party-cadre class linked to the regime 
in place. A precondition to a functioning judicial system is a conducive political 
culture6 of tolerance of diversity and communication, i.e. some measure of 
leeway in the political system that allows conflict and does not suppress dissent. 
But this is an element of history that a country either has or does not have, and 
is relatively scarce in Africa beyond the level of local societies. Empirical 
                                                            
4  Compare also the new phase of war on the Nuba in South Kordofan, Sudan, by the 
North Sudanese army, which was starting in July 2011 as this chapter was being 
finalized. 
5  The more than a year-long post-election crisis in Belgium in 2010-2011, which 
prevented a government from being formed, is a case in point. 
6  Defined here loosely as: a value-based set of political ideas and practices among 
elites and the wider population relating to what legitimate authority is, how politics 
should function and how political consultation is achieved. But there is a split in 
political elite views and popular views of political culture: the political elite often 
appropriate aspects of it that buttress its rule and authority beyond the shared and 
accepted values of the political sphere. 
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assessment is required in every country to establish its nature and scope, and 
any emerging interaction with statutory (state) law.  
The Horn of Africa 
In her 2006 inaugural lecture at Utrecht University, Gerti Hesseling (2006: 6) 
discussed the case of Somaliland, which she found interesting because of its 
original democratic experiment rooted in a history of decentralized political 
practice and normative clan law mediated by elders. The country is indeed a 
remarkable example of an emerging democratic state of a hybrid nature that 
combines ‘modern’ and ‘traditional’ elements: parties, elections, an independent 
press and civil society, a negotiated political order, the incorporation of decen-
tralized clan-organization elements in the legislative structure, and a relatively 
independent judiciary partly based on customary (xeer) law. It has in fact seen 
three peaceful changes of president and government in the post-1991 era. The 
contrast with Southern Somalia, which is mired in chaos and violence, is strik-
ing but it is not clear whether the experiment will last. Gerti hoped that resorting 
to rule-of-law principles and having a creative, adaptable state responding to 
‘living law’ traditions would play a constructive role in conflict prevention. 
This normative legal argument has its merits but we need recourse to other 
factors to explain the recurrence of conflict, repression, inequality and political 
stagnation in economically emerging states and then to gauge the scope and 
chances of law. 
Ethiopia, the most prominent economic and political player in the northeast 
African region has been less successful in establishing representative democ-
racy than its neighbour, Somaliland. The Ethiopian political experience since 
the fall of the military Derg regime in May 1991 deserves close comparative 
scrutiny in order to assess its potential and its setbacks. It has indeed elicited 
many studies, among them: Aalen & Tronvoll (2008); Lefort (2007, 2010); 
Abbink (2009); Tronvoll (2011); Abbink & Hagmann (2011) and Merera 
(2011). In our joint book on election observation and democratization processes 
(Abbink & Hesseling 2000), which was edited at a time when optimism about 
political reform and democratic consolidation in Africa was still strong in both 
academic and policy circles, we were already pleading for a proper contextual 
analysis of politics and elections in African societies, and we were sceptical 
about democratic openings in the face of the unchanged societal conditions and 
the observed tendency of autocratic elites to manipulate ‘elections’ and democ-
ratic reform for their own purposes. Analytical assessments of democratization 
since 2000 have borne out our caution and shown the clear societal and 
historical impediments to political liberalization in unequal, divided societies, as 
well as the limited (and limiting) impact of donor countries and other global 
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powers. Most of the contributions to the international debate on the issue have 
increasingly touched on the social and cultural constraints of politics, showing 
the relevance of these ‘context factors’ (cf. Hesseling 2006: 29-30, 37).  
The debate on democratization in Africa seems to be fading and is being 
replaced by one on ‘failing states’, ‘ungoverned spaces’ and, paradoxically, 
economic growth and foreign investment. Here a new and overstretched Afro-
optimism is evident that is suddenly blind to the armed conflicts, environmental 
problems and the democratic deficits of Africa as well as to the dubious role 
that donors and other foreign countries are playing. Human-rights issues now 
feature as a largely rhetorical frame of reference that is perhaps generally being 
subscribed to but not actively pursued and is indeed difficult to put into 
practice, even by donor countries. Furthermore, in the wake of China’s econo-
mic advances in Africa, the entire rights and democracy discourse has been put 
on hold and even donor countries, notably European ones, are reluctant to 
pursue moral political agendas. They seem to primarily become salesmen for 
their own countries. 
The remainder of this chapter presents an overview of the state of play 
concerning democracy and elections in Ethiopia and, as Gerti advised in her 
2006 work, calls for a better understanding of the long-term factors and atti-
tudes that locally shape power, politics and law. 
Ethiopia is probably the most important country in Northeast Africa. A rela-
tively strong state with about 82 million inhabitants, it is a partner in interna-
tional efforts against (Islamist) terrorism and has a growing economy under 
one-party leadership. It has also been receiving significant donor support – 
almost U$ 2 billion annually – as well as growing Chinese and other foreign 
(agrarian and infrastructural) investment in recent years. In the first half of 
2011, when popular uprisings rocked some of the countries in North Africa, 
Ethiopia (and Eritrea) remained out of the spotlight and their populations 
showed no wish to join in the fray. One might contend: why should they? The 
last elections in May 2010 demonstrated overwhelming support from the voters 
(545 out of the 547 parliamentary seats) for the EPRDF7 ruling party and its 
allies. The same happened in the local elections in 2008 (Aalen & Tronvoll 
2010). So the Ethiopian people have apparently been happy with their rulers 
since 1991. At least, the government and the EPRDF party (they are virtually 
identical) have tried to convince themselves and the outside world of this. 
The phenomenon of repeated massive election wins for the incumbent is part 
of a broader trend of ‘successful’ authoritarian restoration in Africa over the last 
                                                            
7  The Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front developed out of the in-
surgent Tigray People’s Liberation Front. For a recent history by a former insider, 
see Aregawi (2009). 
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several years. It is undoing most of the post-1989 gains made in political 
liberalization and freedoms for civil society. The flexible, adaptive behaviour of 
old and new political elites has yielded mutations of the neo-patrimonial 
systems of power and hegemony (cf. Erdmann 2001). This time the elites have 
been buttressed by intensified global economic competition by other powers for 
land and mineral resources, fears of declining security in conflict-prone zones, 
and a resurfacing appreciation of stronger state influence in economic develop-
ment (e.g. in the guise of the developmental state) provided the state cooperates 
with global capital and economic forces. The post-1991 regime in Ethiopia has 
shown itself to be a prime example of this process. It has neither the inclination 
nor the capacity to share power with other parties and is increasingly orienting 
itself economically and politically towards the Chinese model to escape the 
conditionalities or governance demands tied to classic donor-country funding. 
Ideology unchanged 
In 1993, the new EPRDF-led Ethiopian government issued a document on its 
ideology of governance, containing the following clause: 
We can attain our objectives and goals only if Revolutionary Democracy becomes 
the governing outlook in our society, and only by winning the elections successively 
and holding power without letup can we securely establish the hegemony of Revo-
lutionary Democracy. If we lose in the elections even once, we will encounter a 
great danger.8 
In accordance with this principle, the EPRDF regime is still in power and 
has ensured that all elections since 1991 have gone in its favour. In this chapter, 
I contend that the incumbent EPRDF regime in Ethiopia cannot be voted out of 
power in elections with the current institutional arrangements. Regardless of the 
preferences of the voters, elections will always favour this party, as was 
confirmed in the May 2010 elections. Nevertheless, the regime, like any other 
authoritarian regime that is part of the world order and a member of the UN, is 
regularly engaged and challenged on its record, as it carries the risk of gene-
rating instability, serious inequality and human-rights transgressions in the 
country, as well as hampering inclusive growth. The challenging mainly hap-
pens in the international arena and rarely domestically. Within Ethiopia, for 
example, the government has not allowed public demands or claim making for 
redistributive economic policies. The country knows no meaningful political 
                                                            
8  Source: TPLF-EPRDF, ‘TPLF-EPRDF’s Strategies for Establishing its Hegemony 
and Perpetuating its Rule’ (English translation of a 1993 document in Amharic), first 
published in 1996 in Ethiopian Register (a US magazine) 3(6): 26, which is also 
available on various websites. 
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forces that could voice alternative claims regarding the political-developmental 
path and the national economy. For various reasons, the opposition has not 
gained a strong foothold. But pressure for redistribution and wider stakeholder 
participation is a key element in successful democratization processes. The 
regional and local administrations in Ethiopia offer no alternative basis for 
politics or power formation, being integral, closely monitored parts of the 
national political structure. The claim making that does exist is channelled 
through the ruling party and linked dependent parties, which are ethno-regional 
in nature.9 Elections either for Parliament or for the local authorities (k’ebeles) 
have not yielded a voice of opposition, as will be seen below. 
Ethiopia is an interesting case in Africa. While it has participated in the new 
wave of elections in Africa since 1990, it has not seen a decisive breakthrough 
in electoral reform or sustained democratic politics. The political process offers 
little room for opposition groups, civil-society organizations or parties to help 
formulate or even freely debate policy alternatives. It does not yet allow for a 
change of power to any other party than the incumbent, or for the institutionali-
zation of a really independent justice system. In 1991 the victorious EPRDF 
regime announced a programme of democratization but this was of a special 
variant. Led by largely the same group of leaders since 1991 (even during the 
armed struggle of 1975-1991, see Aregawi [2009]), the EPRDF’s line is ‘revo-
lutionary democracy’, an ideology spawned by Marxism-Leninism, with an 
ever-dominant role for the party in national politics and overall control of the 
country’s political and economic domains of life.10 It was combined with the 
trappings of democracy by allowing ethnic groups’ rights and ethnic parties, a 
freer press, a more mixed and liberal economy and a rhetorical bow to the 
Western donor community. In this, it has always been compared favourably 
with the previous, military regime (1974-1991) and that is seemingly enough 
for most Western donor countries. But Ethiopia is not considered to be evolving 
towards a liberal democracy by its leaders: this form is not seen as feasible or 
applicable in the underdeveloped and ethnically diverse (not to say divided) 
country that Ethiopia still is. Furthermore, the stakes of political power are so 
high that the incumbent party feels that it cannot afford to lose its position of 
privilege and its political-economic networks of control of economy and society 
that have been built up over the past twenty years. Donor-country partners and 
external observers are probably chasing chimeras and have little understanding 
of the importance of ‘revolutionary democracy’ as a governance ideology in 
Ethiopia. It could also simply be the case that they are indifferent, as long as 
                                                            
9  The exceptions are some rebellions in parts of the Oromo areas and in the Ogaden 
where armed insurgent movements are active. 
10  See Bach (2011) for an analysis of this ideology. 
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good economic growth figures are delivered. They often ignore issues of human 
rights, freedoms and due processes of law and economic equity as being rele-
vant for their policy of supporting what they see as stability and economic 
growth. They make recurrent and similar policy errors when dealing with the 
country, hereby assuming that they (the donors) still want to see a more open 
and level democratic system. Their response to flawed elections is often ambi-
valence – they offer no unified response to crises in the political process (see 
Borchgrevink 2008: 209, 213) 
The EPRDF-formulated ideology of revolutionary democracy in Ethiopia is 
based on three core principles: the unquestioned monopoly of state power by a 
vanguard party with an idea of ‘national mission’ that no one can change; top-
down leadership and national policies with internal Leninist-like party control 
and self-evaluation of civil servants and party officials; and the co-opting of all 
political and state public sectors under its ideology. After the critical 2005 
elections, the EPRDF started a mass drive for membership in order to co-opt as 
many Ethiopians as possible into its structure. The leadership often appears to 
adopt a God-like posture where no one can challenge them. The party has also 
tended to become the state, reminiscent of King Louis XIV’s statement L’État, 
c’est moi. A whole new system of political patronage and clientelism (cf. Paulos 
2007) has been established since 1991 that makes autonomous political action 
by new actors and regional or local authorities very difficult. The problems 
faced by opposition politics in Ethiopia, which are frustrated and undermined 
by the incumbent party, have amply demonstrated this. Historically, Ethiopia 
has of course never had a ‘loyal opposition’ in a regulated, predictable political 
arena. While the post-1991 change created an unprecedented opportunity for 
coalitions and issue politics, this road was not followed by the dominant party. 
Opposition parties had great difficulty mobilizing a support base in the country 
(notably in the rural areas) due to persistent obstructions and attacks on their 
leaders and rural activists,11 and have remained quite divided among them-
selves.  
In addition, it should not be forgotten that elections everywhere, and espe-
cially in Africa, are just one part of the process of democratization (or democ-
racy). As emphasized above, the role of a legitimate, independent judiciary is 
perhaps just as vital, also in Ethiopia.12 
                                                            
11  Compare the case of the popular and promising opposition leader (of the CUD and 
later of the UDJ party), former Judge Birtukan Mideqsa, who was repeatedly im-
prisoned and held in solitary confinement since 2008. She was only released in 
October 2010. 
12  It is currently very precarious. Politics strongly pressurizes the judicial institutions, 
especially the High and Supreme Courts. In Ethiopia there is no constitutional court 
either. This role is played by the House of the Federation, the ‘upper chamber’ of 
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The context of Ethiopia’s electoral politics13 
Since 1991 Ethiopia has been a federal democratic republic, succeeding the 
Marxist-Socialist Derg government led by the former military leader Lieutenant 
Colonel Mengistu Haile-Mariam, who was universally reviled by the West and 
became deeply unpopular in Ethiopia itself due to his regime’s violent record 
and economic mismanagement. Under this government, there was one unity 
party, the Workers’ Party of Ethiopia (WPE), and parliamentary elections that 
were held for the Shengo (the then national parliament) displayed no sign of 
democratization. The only positive point was that the smaller, newly recognized 
(ethnic) minority groups were also invited to be represented by some of its own 
members in Parliament, albeit under the wing of the WPE.  
The EPRDF, after having militarily defeated the Derg in May 1991, was 
seen as a breath of fresh air and as the dawn of a new democratic politics. 
Indeed, new liberties of the press and political organization as well as ethnic and 
religious expression were initially allowed. Economic liberalization followed, 
although tightly orchestrated by the party, which kept some core tenets of the 
Derg regime in place, such as the state ownership of all land, and it also started 
many party business ventures. The EPRDF political dispensation was based on 
the opening up of political space but also on the ‘ethnicization’ of politics. 
Citizenship was now to be primarily ‘ethnic’ not national, and sovereignty was 
invested in the ‘nations’, ‘nationalities’ and ‘peoples’ of Ethiopia (not in the 
‘Ethiopian people’ as a whole). These were terms from Stalin’s 1913 tract on 
Marxism and the National Question that have entered general Marxist political 
discourse. Ethnic (not regional, class or territorial) oppression and inequality 
were diagnosed by the TPLF/EPRDF as the root causes of Ethiopia’s problems. 
All ethno-linguistic groups (a certain number of which are officially recognized 
in the 1995 Ethiopian Constitution and other documents) or ‘nationalities’ were 
to be represented in local government and in Parliament, and party formation 
among the population had to be on an ‘ethnic’ basis. This had the positive short-
term effect of allowing people to use their own language and not forcibly 
‘hiding’ their ethnic background, as well as, in some cases, releasing long-pent-
up group emotions or tensions. But it soon discouraged the construction of an 
inclusive national political arena. Pan-Ethiopian, issue-based parties were ac-
                                                                                                                                                 
Parliament, which is strongly influenced by the ruling party (cp. Mgbako et al. 
2006). 
13  Data in this chapter are based on intermittent field research, including surveys and 
the frequent interviewing of political actors and the general public in Ethiopia in 
urban areas (Addis Ababa, Awasa, Shashemenne, Addis Alem and Dessie) as well 
as in the northern and southern countryside over the past ten years, most recently in 
September 2010. 
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tively thwarted or undermined by the ruling party,14 and prevented from running 
campaigns in most regional states. For example, in Tigray Region, the home of 
the dominant TPLF, all the parties except the TPLF, were banned or later, in the 
2010 elections, prevented from putting forward candidates. 
While various rounds of elections at the local, regional and federal level 
were organized under the aegis of the government-controlled National Electoral 
Board, no broad national consensus was ever reached on the procedures and 
outcome of these elections and there were few positive evaluations by indepen-
dent observers. Various reports by external observer missions from the EU and 
the US Carter Center have, however, stated that ‘encouraging gains’ were made 
after 1991. But few Ethiopians share this view. Indeed, in no case have elections 
led to a change in the incumbent regime. The closest Ethiopia has got to this 
was in the 2005 parliamentary and regional council elections where the newly 
formed opposition gained control of Addis Ababa regional council (notably the 
CUD party) and did well in certain other regions and among the emerging urban 
middle classes. But in the ensuing contestation of the election process and the 
vote counting as a whole by both government and opposition parties, the op-
position felt excluded and either could not or did not take up all of the seats they 
won.15 These were watershed elections (Abbink 2006) but were not allowed to 
run their course.  
The EPRDF, which was formally a coalition of four ‘ethnic block’ parties, 
the TPLF, ANDM, OPDO and SEPDF,16 has ruled alone for 20 years now and 
has not been seriously challenged in any round of elections except in 2005. To 
explain its power position and make the Ethiopian case the subject of mean-
ingful comparison across Africa, a contextual understanding is needed of 
Ethiopian authoritarian political tradition, the country’s socio-political hierar-
chies, the way the EPRDF came to power, and the practical implications of the 
new party’s governance ideology (Bach 2011; Abbink 2009). Suffice it to say, 
historically the transfer of power in Ethiopia has never been peaceful: power is 
seen as indivisible and the (rural) masses are cautious about supporting op-
                                                            
14  The first one with a mass following in 1991-1992, the National Democratic Union, 
was disbanded in 1992. See also Vestal (1999: 24f). 
15  For instance, economist Dr Berhanu Nega, the Addis Ababa mayor-elect and a 
leader of the then strong CUD (Coalition for Unity and Democracy opposition party 
that had won 109 seats of the total 547 in the 2005 parliamentary elections), was 
barred from taking up his position. He is now living in exile in the US where he 
leads the Ginbot 7 opposition party. 
16  The Amhara National Democratic Movement for ‘the Amhara’, the Oromo People’s 
Democratic Organisation for ‘the Oromo’, and the Southern Ethiopian People’s 
Democratic Front for the many ethnic groups in the South. They are basically 
satellites of the TPLF. Other such parties exist in the less important regional states 
like Afar, Benishangul-Gumuz, Somali and Gambela. 
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position to the powers-that-be unless they have a realistic chance of winning.17 
The acceptance and institutionalization of a plural political system in conditions 
of economic scarcity and survival is near-impossible because the losers would 
economically (from loss of income and privileges) and judicially be at risk. 
Expectations of decisive democratization through the electoral system should 
thus be tempered. 
Elections so far: Few openings, missed chances 
After its military victory, the EPRDF called a national conference in 1991 at 
which a National Transition Charter was drawn up under it auspices. A non-
elected EPRDF Council of Representatives was the result. And in June 1992 the 
new regime tried its hand at local and regional elections, which were judged 
unfavourably by external observers due to the lack of a level playing field and a 
lack of space for the opposition forces.18 
Elections for a Constituent Assembly were held in June 1994, with the 
EPRDF taking 484 of the 527 seats (Kassahun 1995). This led to a new con-
stitution that was adopted in December 1994 and published in August 1995. 
There have subsequently been four parliamentary elections: in May 1995, May 
2000, May 2005 and May 2010. Their technical organization was of a high 
standard but, according to foreign and domestic observers, the vote was neither 
free nor fair. The 1995 and 2000 elections were marred by boycotts by the 
opposition parties that felt thwarted in recruitment, campaigning and media 
access. There were also registration problems among non-EPRDF candidates 
with the party-controlled National Electoral Board. And the opposition parties 
themselves were not sufficiently well organized. The May 2005 elections were 
the most interesting in that new opposition parties participated in the pre-
election phase and leadership was demonstrated by both young and veteran 
politicians and public figures. There were political debates on television and 
oppositional campaigns in selected parts of the country, notably in Addis 
Ababa. The local press, including several independent private journals, reported 
in detail on the debates and opposition party programmes.19 Hopes were rising, 
but in the countryside, where there were hardly any donor-country election ob-
servers, state repression (arrests, harassment, intimidation and some targeted 
                                                            
17  See the response of peasants following the 2005 elections that is analyzed in the 
perceptive article by Lefort (2007). 
18  See Gamst (1995) and the report by the National Democratic Institute (1992). 
19  Most of the former independent journals have now disappeared, some due to finan-
cial problems, others to intimidation and repression and helped by the new and more 
restrictive 2008 Press Law. 
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killings) was commonplace and free campaigning was impossible.20 The day 
after the elections and before the votes had even been counted, the EPRDF 
declared victory. The counting of votes after the election was fraught with 
tension. Demonstrations and gatherings were forbidden and the counting pro-
ceeded in secrecy and amid controversy. Some unpopular top government 
candidates who did not get elected in the first round in ‘their’ constituency were 
given a recount and then ‘won’ a seat. Nevertheless, the opposition parties, 
notably the CUD, UEDF and OFDM,21 won many more parliamentary seats 
than before: 174 out of the total of 547. Still, the opposition cried foul and an 
electoral process that seemed to have geared up for a free and fair election ran 
aground when the EPRDF reasserted its control, perhaps due to crucial inter-
ference with the counting process. It was thus returned to power with a com-
fortable majority. There was an opportunity to form a coalition government with 
opposition groups and this would probably have been the best way forward, but 
this was unacceptable to the EPRDF government.22 In the street protests in 
Addis Ababa in June and November 2005 when people contested the election 
results and gave vent to their general anger at the government, at least 193 
people were killed and tens of thousands arrested.  
After this dramatic election year, the EPRDF went on to restore its political 
monopoly and returned to business as usual. It invested in security and political 
officers (cadres) to increase domestic control and prevent a similar situation 
happening in future elections, especially in the countryside, which is usually 
ignored by donor-country monitors. Having duly expressed their concern at the 
2005 violence, donor countries gradually started again offering the government 
loans and grants for development. Despite the fact that the Ethiopian leadership 
was challenged to give serious consideration to the development of a more 
democratic political system, no serious response was given by donor countries. 
This has remained the general pattern and since 2005, the EPRDF has shown no 
intention of relinquishing power and has even tried to convince the foreign 
donor community and public opinion of the ‘lack of alternatives’ to its rule. 
                                                            
20  Information on such incidents is found in the annual US State Department country 
reports on human rights: www.state.gov/documents/organization/160121.pdf 
21  United Ethiopian Democratic Front and Oromo Federal Democratic Movement. 
22  A judgment like that of the Carter Center on these elections is typical of the unhelp-
ful prevarication in donor-country discourse. ‘The elections process demonstrated 
significant advances in Ethiopia’s democratization process, including most impor-
tantly the introduction of a more competitive electoral process that could potentially 
result in a pluralistic, multiparty political system’.  
www.cartercenter.org/documents/2199.pdf 
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Many donor countries, for example the UK,23 have bought this argument and 
are making few efforts to call for inclusive politics or constructive engagement 
with the opposition. The divisions within the Ethiopian opposition groups are 
indeed significant, as was evident in the run-up to the May 2010 elections and 
in the post-election period. But this is also in large part due to the divisive 
activities of government moles in the opposition parties and to the persistent 
discouragement, not to say obstruction, of opposition campaign activities by the 
EPRD government, especially in the rural areas.24 The base line is that the 
streak of coercion and control present is a recurring feature in the political sys-
tem in Ethiopia. 
The May 2010 elections went ‘according to plan’: they were well organized 
by the ruling party and its cadres, with campaigning and voter mobilization 
being pre-empted by the opposition, few public debates, frequent co-opting of 
rural voters by the incumbent, and warnings throughout the election campaign 
period about voting ‘correctly’. The threat that voting for the opposition, which 
was not a unified movement that could rally all people, would entail great 
livelihood risks worked. In addition, the regime’s record in the sphere of 
national economic or infrastructural dynamics also appealed to many voters, 
despite the lack of freedom and livelihood stability. Millions were also depen-
dent on the party for their jobs. The EU Election Observers Mission issued a 
critical report on the democratic content of the 2010 elections and their wider 
political context but after a few months, donors, including the IMF and the 
World Bank, went back to business as usual.25 
Regarding the negligible opposition vote in 2010 and apart from the failings 
in the electoral process (including the intimidation and repression of campaign-
ing opposition members and the restrictions imposed by the National Electoral 
                                                            
23  See ‘Britain Keeping Quiet about Ethiopia Repression’, Daily Telegraph, 23 May 
2010 and the criticism on the Department for International Development (DFID) in 
HRW (2010: 84-85). 
24  Cf. 3 November 2009 Reuters news report: ‘Ethiopian Opposition Says Nearly 450 
Members Jailed’: www.reuters.com/article/latestCrisis/idUSLT86250. They also 
recorded the assassination of seven members in that year. See also J. McClure 
(2010), ‘Ethiopian Opposition Leader Says Supporters “Hunted” After May 23 
Election’; Bloomberg news message, 26 May 2010; and ‘Zenawi Crackdown on 
Opposition to Prevent Protests’, Afrol News message, 19 March 2011: 
http://www.afrol.com/articles/37609 
25  EU Foreign Affairs coordinator Ms C. Ashton gave a predictable statement: ‘The 
legislative elections in Ethiopia were an important moment in the democratic pro-
cess in the country. I welcome the peaceful conduct of the elections and I con-
gratulate the Ethiopian voters for showing their commitment to this process with a 
high turnout.’ Many wondered which elections she was talking about. 
www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/114624.pdf 
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Board), the issue of the political culture in Ethiopia needs to be borne in mind. 
As Clapham (1988: 21) has noted, historical heritage and engrained attitudes 
towards politics play a role in shaping political attitudes, and a reference to 
cultural factors is ‘inescapable’. People in the rural areas in Ethiopia, who in 
many respects are dependent on the authorities, tend to fear and express support 
for the reigning powers in order to protect themselves. This is the meaning of 
the motto cited at the start of this chapter: one cannot openly accuse the 
government of anything. If people are known to have voted for the opposition, 
they will face adverse consequences. Lefort (2007) has convincingly made this 
point. Voting for the opposition is a risk and can endanger access to basic 
resources (land, state support, basic commodities, food aid) and thus reduces 
one’s chances of survival.26 This is all the more so because the opposition can-
not deliver anything tangible as they are held outside the system.27 
This situation raises the familiar dilemma for foreign involvement. Can or 
should the international community support electoral processes in an authorita-
rian environment that does not deliver peaceful elections, let alone power 
change, and that is not conducive to democratization? If tensions are exacer-
bated and the threat of violence is present, would it not be preferable to desist 
from engaging with the regime? However understandable this position may be, 
it would amount to unreflexively supporting and legitimizing undemocratic 
politics, underestimating the Ethiopian public, and caving in to authoritarianism 
and intimidation (cp. Easterly 2010). China, one of Ethiopia’s major economic 
partners and a self-declared ‘great friend’ of the regime, has adopted this 
attitude. It is not the model that is internationally acceptable in view of the UN 
charters and other global treaties and agreements on democratization and ac-
countable government that even the Ethiopian government is partner to. While 
the options are indeed limited, critical engagement with the regime cannot but 
continue.28 And the instruments in the development partnership, through the 
IMF, the World Bank and Western donor-country programmes providing funds 
to the Ethiopian government, should be more critically and consistently used. 
Below I focus in some more detail on a few relevant analyses recently 
offered by political scientists Lindberg (2009b) and van de Walle (2009) on 
                                                            
26  See also Eskinder Nega (2010) ‘Notes from an Interstate Bus: A Farmer on Election 
2010’: www.abugidainfo.com/?p=14202 
27  Cf. the case of Inderaw Mohammed, an Ethiopian opposition candidate who was 
beaten up and refused food aid, cited in McLure (2010). 
28  This was to some extent done in the case of the bona fide and popular opposition 
leader Ms Birtukan Mideqsa (see Footnote 10), who was given a long prison sen-
tence on the basis of ‘evidence’ that would not stand up in a serious court of law. 
Behind the scenes, this was criticized by donor countries and she was subsequently 
released from her (second) period of imprisonment in October 2010. 
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African elections and present a brief evaluation of Ethiopia’s most recent ex-
perience with elections in May 2010 in the light of these contributions. 
Policy experiences and theory 
Lindberg (2009b) has offered an interesting study on elections in Africa and is, 
by and large, optimistic about the generally positive influence of elections on 
the democratization process in Africa. He sees trends such as continued high 
voter turnout, the improvement of governments’ legitimacy through elections 
and the constraining and cajoling of political leaders by elections as encour-
aging. His main recommendations are that election observation is needed (and 
discourages polarization) and that it is useful to invest in opposition forces and 
their activities.  
In theory, these recommendations are attractive but in practice it is not that 
easy. For example, investing in the capacity of opposition seems an objective, 
logical step in a process of institutionalizing democratic structures and com-
petitive procedures but donors will be accused by the incumbent regime of not 
being neutral or unbiased, even if they do not say that they would be in favour 
of opposition forces. These kinds of activities are easily seen as ‘interference in 
internal affairs’, as was evident in the 2005 Ethiopian elections.  
Van de Walle (2009) has analyzed two decades of multiparty electoral poli-
tics in Africa. He considered three main questions. First, is democracy generally 
‘a good thing’ for Africa? He seems positive about this. Africa’s last two 
decades of democratization have perhaps also seen the continent’s best years for 
economic growth and poverty alleviation in the post-colonial era. Democrati-
zation has also resulted in an increase in social spending and there is some 
evidence of this in Ethiopia too. Over the last two decades, economic growth 
has been substantial, with a growth rate of above 8% on average in the past few 
years according to government data. Nevertheless, democratic freedom and 
rights have not developed well, especially since 2005, and there has not been 
any causal relationship with this trend.  
Van de Walle’s second question was whether one could have democracy 
without elections. He disagrees with the suggestion that the absence of 
multiparty electoral politics could ultimately lead to good governance. There is 
no democracy without elections and donors should increasingly focus on the 
demand side of governance. The best predictor of how well an African country 
is doing is the regularity of political alternation (i.e. an orderly change of ruling 
party or national president).  
We note that Ethiopia has not seen any change of government since 1991 so 
this is, in itself, a sign that democracy is not optimal, or is perhaps even absent. 
The question is whether the ideology of the EPRDF is informed by basic 
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democratic principles or whether the party is just organizing elections to try to 
maintain a democratic image for its donors. If it is just about image building 
then one could say that dysfunctional elections might even contribute negatively 
to the democratization process. Meanwhile, the population has been losing trust 
and confidence in the electoral record of a ‘façade democracy’ and shows little 
willingness to voluntarily participate in future elections, and certainly not by 
risking voting for the opposition (cf. Lefort 2007, 2010) because the election 
results per voting constituency show the power-holders – via the EPRDF-
controlled National Electoral Board – what the actual division of votes was. 
There are plenty of empirical indications that constituencies with significant 
numbers of votes for the opposition, notably since the 2005 elections, have 
faced reprisals.29 Popular faith in the judicial system is even less obvious. In 
general, a constant refrain in answers given by ordinary Ethiopians to questions 
about the justice system is that ‘there is no law’ (Amharic: higg yälläm). This 
may be an exaggeration but there is certainly a deep-seated scepticism about the 
fairness of court procedures, also regarding election complaints, and about the 
ease with which many judges can be bribed. The statement also reflects the 
view of many Ethiopians that the government ultimately can over-rule anything 
without being called to account. 
Van de Walle also considered whether Africa has been continuing to democ-
ratize or, on the other hand, is regressing. Based on the Afrobarometer, he has 
suggested a stable commitment on the part of ordinary Africans to democracy 
(cf. also Bratton 2001) and the election machinery does appear to be grinding 
forward more effectively with each election. In general, he concludes that 
democracy is progressing despite the inevitable problems and constraints. But 
while we see patchy incremental changes in several countries, the process is 
precarious and reversible, and so this conclusion is somewhat premature. In 
Ethiopia, for instance, progress has been very limited and there is no firm com-
mitment by the governing party to open and deliberate democracy in evidence. 
The 2010 elections have in fact shown consolidation of a trend of decreased 
democratic space, which set in following the May 2005 elections and was 
confirmed in a spate of restrictive laws. Little room is left for alternative views 
and votes, and oppositional voices are all too often insulted and delegitimized. 
Van de Walle’s main recommendation is that donors increase their support 
to NGOs and maintain communication with African governments on abuses of 
                                                            
29  The same accusations emerged in the 2011 BBC Newsnight TV documentary re-
corded in Ethiopia and screened on 4 August 2011, attracting a lot of media stir and 
debate: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/programmes/newsnight/9556288.stm. See also M. 
Tran, ‘Ethiopia Using Aid as a Political Tool’, The Guardian, 5 August 2011. 
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power, notably within the executive branch. Both recommendations are very 
general, and even on this front, governments can anticipate donor measures to 
minimize the impact. This has happened in Ethiopia, where the new 2009 NGO 
law, the Charities and Societies Proclamation, drastically restricts (inter)national 
NGO activity and prohibits them from being active in the domains of human, 
civic and women’s rights or receiving more than 10% of their income from 
abroad.30 
Donor dilemmas:  
Measuring elections as a criterion of development commitment 
As part of the Horn of Africa, Ethiopia is in a region still plagued by deep-
rooted conflicts, stemming partly from colonial intervention and partly from 
historical and geo-political fault lines. It has been affected by conflicts along the 
Eritrean border, the Somali civil war, rebellions, refugee flows, drought and 
famine. However it has been seen by most donors as the most promising entity 
in the Horn, where peace, stability and sustainable development, terms which 
are found in all donor documents, can and have to be promoted. The official 
aims of donor efforts are to enhance public service delivery by the Ethiopian 
government, strengthen and empower civil society and the private sector, and 
improve government accountability and transparency.  
In the run-up to the 2005 elections, it appeared that multiparty democracy in 
Ethiopia was taking off: there was active, content-based campaigning in the 
media by the EPRDF and opposition parties, and an EU observation mission 
was invited. However, the election and its aftermath were not up to the stand-
ards demanded and abuses of power by the EPRDF were shown, probably via 
the rigging of vote-counting, and there had been serious violations of human 
rights among opposition voters and candidates. The international community 
was initially very concerned about these issues. The mechanism for coordina-
tion among donors to Ethiopia, the Development Assistance Group (DAG), is-
sued a strong statement saying that it was collectively reviewing the develop-
ment cooperation modalities to Ethiopia in view of the negative aftermath of the 
elections. In December 2005, after a second round of killings the previous 
month, when security forces shot dozens of protesters, the budget-support 
donors – the UK, Canada, Ireland, Germany, Sweden, the World Bank, the 
European Commission and the African Development Bank – even planned to 
withhold a total of U$$ 370-375 million of earmarked support. Donors were 
then briefly unified in protest against the Ethiopian government, and the EU 
                                                            
30  Cf. ‘World Bank Urges Ethiopia to Ease Rules on NGOs’, Wall Street Journal, 18 
May 2009. 
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later mediated pacts between the opposition and the EPRDF. The critical donor 
dialogue with the government and threats of withholding financial support 
resulted in a new governance matrix being drawn up in which ‘good-govern-
ance’ improvements and actions were identified. This matrix is now part of 
Ethiopia’s current Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP).  
Donors and the government also agreed in 2006 to a package of measures to 
improve governance and democratic institutions: the Democratic Institutions 
Program (DIP).31 Ownership of the programme was with the government of 
Ethiopia and the UNDP. The DIP is sponsored by many donors but it has not 
generally been considered a success (HRW 2010: 70-71) due to its focus on 
government-defined criteria.32 And interestingly, little is said in this DIP 
programme document on the importance of party organization, the role of op-
position or free and fair elections. Many donors decided not to withhold funds 
after May 2005 but to reallocate them to other programmes, with sector ear-
marking and monitoring procedures. In this respect, most of the money was 
reallocated to the Protection of Basic Services (PBS) programme at the local 
level in an attempt to bypass the central authorities. Most donors thus main-
tained their aid levels by reallocating funds to the local authorities (woredas). 
Ethiopia’s largest donor, the US, has continued to give the country close to 30% 
of its total aid in bilateral support.  
After the 2005 elections, several donors chose to sharpen their strategy 
towards Ethiopia with a two-track policy. They have sought to contribute to the 
country achieving the Millennium Development Goals of alleviating poverty 
and have, in effect, supported its economic programme while improving democ-
racy and human rights. They have supported programmes geared at improving 
good governance and democracy by strengthening civil society, encouraged the 
process of decentralization and bolstered democratic structures and human 
rights. To combat poverty and achieve the MDGs, they have also pursued poli-
cy dialogues, provided services at the local level, strengthened rural economic 
development, improved the investment climate and the private sector, and 
supported the education and health sectors. 
The effects of this strategy, carried out half-heartedly, are difficult to meas-
ure. There are many influencing factors, for example, the so-called independent 
mindedness and unwillingness of the Ethiopian regime to enter into real 
dialogue on democratic values and power sharing, the insecurity of field data, 
and the lack of a monitoring structure (and even of permission to carry out 
                                                            
31  See the DAG website: www.dagethiopia.org. 
32  For example, support is expressed for strengthening the state’s ‘Ethiopian Human 
Rights Commission’ but compared to the already existing, independent Ethiopian 
Human Rights Council (EHRCO) this is not seen as a sufficiently credible insti-
tution. 
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proper monitoring). The government has resented what it sees as the conditions 
and requests of donors and the international community in general, although 
these are in line with internationally accepted and UN-chartered norms for 
democratic development, rule of law and accountability. When, for instance, the 
donor-country Development Assistance Group’s report on options after the 
2005 post-election crackdowns was seen as ‘too critical’, PM Meles Zenawi 
explicitly told donors to shelve it. And amazingly, the donors, again led by the 
UK, did so (cf. Borchgrevink 2008: 216). Another example was when the 
Netherlands put the restrictive CSO law, which prohibited most NGO activities, 
on the EU’s agenda in Brussels in June 2008. In direct response, the Nether-
lands ambassador was called to account for his actions by the Ethiopian 
Minister of Foreign Affairs, who said that that the Netherlands was ‘interfering 
in internal affairs’. After the 2010 elections when the opposition won only two 
parliamentary seats (and with one of these, an independent, later declaring for 
the EPRDF), the Ethiopian PM anticipated a critical EU monitors’ report and 
forbade them from coming back to Addis Ababa to present it. In a speech in 
November 2010, he incorrectly described the report as ‘useless trash that 
deserves to be thrown in the garbage’.33 
Secondly, it is difficult to unite donor efforts. In practice, their different 
national interests are too conflicting to allow them to adopt a common policy 
towards Ethiopia. There is no discussion about negative governance trends but 
there are also other considerations too. Ethiopia is perceived to be a loyal 
partner in the ‘fight against terrorism’ and in attempts to resolve the problems in 
Somalia. It is playing a significant role in peace missions too, for example in 
Darfur, and, in July 2011 in Abyei, also in Sudan. Prime Minister Meles is an 
active leader on the world stage and has participated in the G20, the 2009 
Copenhagen climate conference, the 2010 Cancún climate change conference 
and the IGAD and has visited both China and India. The ideology of the 
EPRDF government, advocating a self-declared, reinvented ‘developmental 
state’, finds support with many donors and EPRDF policy is seen by many as 
delivering results, being pro-poor, being directed at achieving the MDGs, and 
leading to annual economic growth of an estimated 7%-9%.34 Even though this 
is a tenuous judgment and is based neither on sufficiently broad research nor on 
a reading of all the available studies, economic growth has indeed occurred and 
has positive effects on education, infrastructure and service delivery.35 How-
                                                            
33  See P. Heinlein, ‘Meles Clashes with EU about Election Report’, VOA News, 15 
November 2010. 
34  According to the African Development Bank figures:  
www.africaneconomicoutlook.org/en/countries/east-africa/ethiopia); cf. World Bank 
(2009: i-ii, 1). 
35  Donor support of ca. U$ 25 billion over the past two decades has played a role. 
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ever, it is also quite selective and non-inclusive, and is going hand in hand with 
high inflation (especially food prices) and perennial food insecurity for millions 
of Ethiopians every year. Nor is the quality of all statistical data and figures 
provided by the government beyond debate.36 In July 2011, the government 
even ran into an argument with the IMF and the World Bank over these figures 
and also about the World Bank critique concerning the ‘unrealistic assumptions’ 
of some key government programmes, like the 2010 Growth and Transforma-
tion Plan.  
In the end, the geo-political considerations and the economic and poverty-
alleviation results in Ethiopia are more important for most donor countries than 
good-governance indicators or the achievement of democratic freedoms and 
respect for human rights.37 In other words, Ethiopia has, comparatively speak-
ing, ‘good enough governance’ for many donors. Other considerations, notably 
from the UK, are that there is ‘no serious alternative’ to the EPRDP and that if 
donors increase their pressure on Ethiopia there is a risk that this may lead to 
their own exclusion. Clearly, Ethiopia has become more confident now that 
Chinese, Indian and Middle Eastern investments are increasing and without any 
accompanying requirements or conditions on human rights, rule of law and 
good governance. The Ethiopian government is increasing its leverage and 
playing one off against the other and some donors are now afraid that if they are 
too critical, they will lose influence (and business interests). In this bleak 
situation, support for democracy falls by the wayside38 and the Ethiopian people 
will ultimately suffer more. Recent trends in donor-country policy, for example 
in the Netherlands, represent a shift towards economic investment, business 
ventures, environment and water issues. Governance and rule-of-law issues are 
now secondary and, in view of the disappointing 2010 elections, there is a sense 
of despondency about them. 
 
                                                            
36  See ‘Meles in a Row with World Bank, IMF on Economic Performance’, in: Capital 
(Addis Ababa weekly), 10 July 2011. See also W. Davison, ‘Ethiopia’s Investment 
Plan May Be Unsustainable, World Bank Official Says’, Bloomberg News Agency 
message, 8 June 2011. 
37  Many subscribe to the rather condescending TIA (This is Africa) myth (cf. Zimeta 
2010). 
38  See the dubious and fearful response by the DAG on the 2010 HRW report on 
possible aid misuse: ‘DAG Statement – Human Rights Watch (HRW) report: Devel-
opment without Freedom – How Aid Underwrites Repression in Ethiopia’, 21 Octo-
ber 2010, www.dagethiopia.org. 
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Concluding remarks 
Elections in a political system that allows no real political communication, i.e. 
where citizens’ voices cannot make a difference, have little meaning. Indeed, 
elections according to a Western model presuppose a society that is open to 
alternative views, institutional dialogue and incumbents that could be defeated. 
These conditions are absent, and while there was some prospect that the 2005 
elections would further them the old autocratic pattern was fully confirmed in 
2010. Lindberg’s (2009b: 31, 45) general view that repeated elections create 
democratic momentum or are a ‘powerful force for political change’ cannot be 
corroborated.  
It should be remembered that Ethiopia, like many other African countries, is 
a ‘limited access’ society and its political system and resources (including the 
business world, cf. the World Bank 2009 report) are quite closed and virtually 
monopolized. Elections are barely useful in such a non-enabling context where 
even communication about elementary policies is suppressed. As Helen Epstein 
noted in her discussions with World Bank Ethiopia director Ken Ohashi:  
In order to survive, the poor farmers I met in southern Ethiopia may not need a 
change of government every four to eight years, desirable as this may be. But at the 
very least they do need the political space to negotiate grievances concerning every-
day well-being, such as perceived unfair or politicized exclusion from jobs and hu-
manitarian programs, overtaxation, and decisions about how to manage their land. 
Right now many Ethiopians don’t have this space, and no vertically administered 
food aid or agricultural extension program will ever substitute for it.39 
The title of this chapter, ‘Democracy Deferred’, does not just refer to the 
Ethiopian leadership’s strategy of delay or redefinition of democracy by closely 
organizing elections. The Western donor community seems to be following the 
same strategy of delay, judging Ethiopia either as ‘not mature enough’ for par-
liamentary democracy, fair and free elections or the rule of law (even according 
to Ethiopia’s constitution), or not realistically seeing themselves as having the 
leverage required to influence events. They thus remain content with the eco-
nomic growth figures and infrastructure investments that the government is 
pursuing. They also see the regime as a beacon of stability in the wider Horn in 
comparison with Sudan or the Somali mayhem, and while in the latter case there 
is a geo-strategic grain of truth in this approach, the argument is problematic. 
As a growing body of literature shows, even Ethiopia itself is not stable, with its 
rebellions, clashes and significant discontent. The moral and political issues are 
unresolved about whether and how to support countries with façade democra-
                                                            
39  H. Epstein, Reply to Ohashi, on ’Cruel Ethiopia’, 24 June 2010: 
www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2010/jun/24/cruel-ethiopia 
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cies or illiberal systems that impose policies top-down, insufficiently respect 
human rights, repress the media, co-opt the population into a one-party structure 
and prevent elections from running their course. Donor countries and their aid 
policies have not played a visible role in promoting rule of law in Ethiopia or in 
urging the regime to respect its own constitution. As van de Walle (2005: 83) 
already noted, the international aid system needs serious reform. But none has 
as yet been implemented unless we count the growing ‘securitization’ of devel-
opment aid and the rapid rise of China as an economic competitor of traditional 
donors in Africa as such. 
The 2011 wave of violence and destabilizing protest in various North Afri-
can and Arab countries however shows that betting on the stability of (now 
toppled) autocratic regimes was risky and may come to revisit those who sup-
port them. Admittedly, the options in the international system are limited – 
political, let alone military, interference and pressure are fraught with problems 
– but continued engagement is necessary, even if illusions about meaningful 
change in the short term are not cherished. Democratization is a multifaceted 
and slow societal process that took a few centuries to yield mature and in-
stitutionalized systems in the West. But there is no a priori reason to suppose 
that it will need as long in today’s developing countries in view of the democ-
ratic preferences of their citizens, and it would be condescending to claim that 
they cannot learn from the experience of others or deal with the totally different 
globalized setting of today. The Ethiopian government always speaks of the 
country being ‘in a process of democracy’ – this can be extended into the future 
indefinitely and they make no hurry. They are stimulated in this strategy of 
delay by the inconsistent if not indifferent approach of foreign players in Africa. 
The Chinese and other self-declared ‘political non-interferers’ in Africa have no 
strategy in this respect. Western donor countries, although betting on develop-
mental dictators or autocrats, sometimes think that when economies grow nicely 
then in the long run democratic structures, constitutional rule and equitable re-
distribution policies will eventually emerge by themselves. They appear to run 
out of options and seem satisfied with ‘good enough governance’ (cf. Grindle 
2004), but forget that regimes in developing countries are now so interlocked 
and influenced by global processes and developmental initiatives that many 
shortcuts to democratic governance improvement are available, if the political 
will is there. Ethiopia has also signed international treaties, has a constitution 
with many (in name) democratic clauses, has an overall developmental rhetoric 
and societal dynamism, is a partner in multilateral development programmes 
and international affairs, and should be encouraged to live up to the (basics of) 
international norms and practices of democratic rule. There is a global politico-
legal discourse on rights and consensus governance that countries can no longer 
retreat from (cf. Merry 2006: 110). In this sense, some (aid) conditionalities 
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remain inevitable. Policies to enhance political representation and interaction, 
foster inclusive growth, realize more secure business conditions and create a 
trustworthy judiciary would produce more domestic and regional stability. In 
addition, the events in North Africa, Syria and Bahrain in 2011 have shown that 
the clamour for democracy, justice and law is growing globally. Donor coun-
tries that pride themselves on striving for democracy and growth for developing 
countries would do better to continue to critically engage the neo-autocratic 
developing countries to whom they give funds, as well as to redefine the terms 
of their engagement. As a recent World Bank (2009: 103) report on reforming 
the Ethiopian investment climate said: ‘a tolerance for dissenting views and 
alternatives to established policies is an essential ingredient to the reform’. This 
is cautious criticism, and urges a general attitude from which Ethiopia, both in 
politics and in the economy, would greatly benefit. It also applies to civic and 
media rights, which still exist in the country but are under serious pressure.40 
More meaningful partnerships – not only with the government elite – could be 
built that would draw in and benefit the population. The development of a more 
independent justice system – not only on paper but also in practice – is key 
here.41 This is, however, very unlikely in the current political atmosphere in 
Ethiopia, and donors are not seen to be acting on it. Although explainable in 
terms of rapidly changing international business competition and a fixation on 
economic growth as a panacea for everything, donor countries, when dealing 
with autocratic regimes, cannot match their own alleged ideals of furthering 
democratic governance and rule of law with their own practices. This apparent 
incapacity is one of the enduring policy paradoxes marking their record in post-
Cold War Africa. 
 
 
                                                            
40  The latest bad turn was the ‘anti-terrorism’ law (FDRE, ‘Anti-Terrorism Procla-
mation’, Federal Negarit Gazeta 15(57), 29 August 2009) that criminalizes any 
reporting on or citing of people deemed affiliated to a ‘terrorist organization’ as 
defined by the government, with indications that this extends to designated oppo-
sition parties. The element of arbitrariness and intimidation is obvious, and this may 
close down independent reporting on opposition activities. See Argaw Ashine, ‘Ethi-
opian media hit by new anti-terrorism law’, Africa Review (Nairobi), 24 August 
2011. 
41  There have been various initiatives in this field but the aspect of democracy building 
via the judicial system is not entertained by donors. See the World Bank programme 
on ‘Reforming the Ethiopian Justice System’, where the emphasis again is on 
‘capacity building’: http://go.worldbank.org/VFRY47DIR0. 
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